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Althusserian Theory: From Scientific Truth to Institutional History
Abstract
Scholars have emphasized the scientific and the rationalist features of Althusser's work, but few have
noted its post-structuralist aspects, especially its Foucauldian accounts of discourse and power. In the
early Pour Marx, Althusser divides ideological practices from objective science and theoretical norms
from empirical facts; however, in several later essays Althusser repudiates his earlier faith in theory's
normative force as well as his broad distinction between science and ideology. He argues that every
discipline establishes its own relationship between its ideological history and its formal, scientific ideals.
This argument, together with Althusser's earlier rejection of totalizing approaches, establishes important
parallels with Foucault's archaeological studies. The literary theory of Tony Bennett, who develops a
Foucauldian critique of traditional and Marxist aesthetics, illuminates the rich implications of these
parallels for cultural analyses.
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The spectacular collapse of the USSR and other Communist states
has only exacerbated the hostile relationship of Marxism and postmodern
theory. On the one hand, Marxists complain that postmodern theorists
refuse to see society as a whole or to preserve culture's autonomous
ideals (Best and Kellner 220; Jameson, "Regarding Postmodernism"
39). On the other hand, postmodern theorists fear that Marxism cannot
overcome its totalitarian nature or answer its poststructuralist opponents (Poster 38-39; Barrett 157-61). Even the innovative theory of
Louis Althusser suffers from this debilitating opposition. Scientific
realists praise the Althusser who fears that liberal humanist beliefs
destroy the objectivity of Marxist theory; theoretical rationalists esteem
the Althusser who defends the autonomous norms of formal thought,
but postmodern theorists complain that Althusser, along with the
Marxist tradition, cannot assimilate the twentieth century world of
discourse, media, and high-tech communications. I mean to show that,
in addition to the scientific and the rationalist stance, Althusserian
theory develops a postmodern stance that resists the totalitarian character of its predecessors and elaborates a Foucauldian account of
knowledge. Moreover, the literary theory of Tony Bennett, who
criticizes traditional and Marxist aesthetics in these Foucauldian terms,
outlines the rich implications of this Althusser for cultural study.

The Scientific Althusser
Objective, scientific, but hardly postmodern, the first Althusser
emerges in Pour Marx, which brings together his essays on the young
Marx, dialectics, theater, science, and humanism. When he wrote these
essays in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, Marxism-Leninism, the
French Communist party, and the French Left enjoyed a high prestige
inconceivable in post-Communist America. At the same time, the ongoing revelations of Stalinist dogma and brutality led Althusser to fear
that an intrusive, non-scientific humanism was corrupting Marxist
theory.
To defend the integrity of a scientific Marxism, he critiques
humanist
of Karl Marx. He grants that Feuerbach's humanism
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influenced the young Marx, but he argues that Marx repudiated this
speculative humanism and adopted a scientific outlook. A critic of
established religion, Feuerbach argued that by attributing society's
powers to God, religion alienates human kind from its essential powers
or "species-being." Even though a society's art, science, industry,
government, or education produced impressive works, the established
religion attributed these achievements to God's will, divine providence,
or some equally mystical figure, not to humanity's social powers. A
critic of Hegel, Feuerbach also argued that what Hegel called the
"cunning of reason" mystified social forces in a similar way; they
simply develop the pre-determined rationality of the world spirit, not
the potentiality of their own powers. Althusser admits that this secular,
humanist critique of religion and Hegel allowed Marx "to think the
contradiction between the essence of the state [reason] and its existence
[unreason]" (Pour Marx 231; my translation). Still, Althusser insists
that in The German Ideology Marx discovered the fault of Feuerbach's
theory: it remains speculative. Like Hegel, Feuerbach does not abstract
the theoretical concepts ofthe mind from the nature ofempirical reality.
He idly deduces empirical reality from the mind's concepts and denies,
as a result, the authenticating force of what Marx calls "sensuous
human activity" (German 197). Marx recognizes that Feuerbach
repudiates Hegel's alienated reconstruction of society's essential powers but not Hegel's speculative reconstruction of scientific concepts.
Althusser suggests that, unlike Feuerbach, Marx rejects this speculative
self-consciousness and goes on to develop a purely scientific Marxism.
all philosophical humanism is
As Althusser says, the "rupture with
not a secondary detail; it is one with the scientific discovery of Marx"
(Pour Marx 234).
Some critics say that this account of Marx's rupture with Hegelian
theory justifies the unjustifiable dogmas of Marxism-Leninism, the
French Communist Party, or the Stalinist USSR (Barrett 87-88;
Fougeyrollas 20-22; Jay 405, 411). Other critics say that this account
of a Marxist science rejects only Stalinist "humanism," not all
Hegelian theory (Aronowitz 124-25; Jameson Political 27). These
contrary views misconstrue Althusser's account ofMarx's rupture with
Feuerbach and, more generally, Hegelian humanism. Primarily philosophical, this account assumes that Marxist theory is a hermeneutic
practice subverting the theoretical self-consciousness of Hegelian
theory. In Reading Capital, Althusser, whose colleague at the Ecole
Normal Superieure was Jacques Derrida, says that Marxist philosophy
is a circular hermeneutic, not a transcendent truth. Marxist philosophy
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/3
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application of the very beliefs which the traditional humanist expects
the external world to betray (34). At the same time, Althusser denies that
this metaphysical closure contains scientific theory. Scientific theory
does not simply describe what lies outside the circle of western
metaphysics; this theory escapes the hermeneutic circle because Marx's
rupture with Hegelian humanism opens up a radically new space, the
positive space of history (54).
Some critics complain that this account fails to identify the
specific point at which Marx breaks with Hegelian humanism and
develops this new scientific theory (Steven Smith 506). This objection
is well-known but misleading: a hermeneutic practice that deconstructs
the metaphysical language of Hegelian theory does not divide Hegelian
humanism and scientific theory so neatly. Other critics object that a
phenomenological hermeneutics favors indeterminacy, free play, and
difference. To retain scientific truth, especially the well-known, economic determination, is to repress the indeterminacy fostered by this
hermeneutics (Parker 59-60). This objection is forceful but one-sided:
Althusser's hermeneutics is rationalist, not Heideggerian nor Derridean.
In a Cartesian manner Althusser allows the skeptical doubt of the
phenomenologist but preserves the objective truths of the scientist.

The Rationalist Althusser
The rationalist Althusser does not abandon the scientific objectivity of Marxist theory; he assimilates the science to the rationalist's
theoretical norms. That is to say, he defines science in a formal, not in
a dogmatic way: it can grasp reality only if it rigorously develops its
concepts and its terms, not if it conforms with practice, fact, or truth.
In these formal terms, scientific theory establishes its own criteria of
truth. By contrast, what Althusser calls ideology imposes the familiar
conformity of theory and practice or ideas and facts. This anti-humanist
conformity is not altogether negative. It is well known that he endowed
ideology with a positive role: it constructs ("interpellates") a subject.
Ideology does not represent falsehood or misrepresentation; ideology
explains the subject's role in a society's socio-economic structurewhat Althusser calls the subject's relation to the relations of production.
Nonetheless, because theory preserves its own criteria of validity, he
claimed that theory resists this ideological interpellation and effectively grasps the nature of reality. As scholars have shown, Althusser
believed that precise, scientific theory escapes the corrosive force of
discourse and reflects the true nature of the real.
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Some critics say that this account of a scientific theory betrays the
rationalist's unduly optimistic belief that some preordained harmony
brings nature and reason together (Glucksman 289; Aronowitz 180-81).
Other scholars object that this notion of theory renders it autonomous,
if not neutral. As Dominick LaCapra says, Althusser favors a subtle
"positivist" scientism that denies the ideological character of objective science (13,166; Aronowitz 173; Belsey 62-64). Still other scholars
accept Althusser's account of a scientific theory but reject his account
of the subject and its ideologies. These scholars complain that this
account reduces "virtually any aspect of contemporary society" to "a
symptom of `bourgeois' ideology" (McClellan 82), fragments and
fetishizes the subject and inflates and absolutizes language (Anderson
Tracks 55), or imposes a robotlike, "functionalist" conformity with
established discourse (Montag 72; Hirst 43-6).

The Post-Structuralist Althusser

Michele Barrett suggests that while Foucault's account of discourse answers such objections well enough, they destroy not only
Althusser's account of ideology and science but the broad Marxist
account as well (157-61; Poster 38-39). I admit that Althusser does not
answer them. Still, he does respond to them, and his responses outline
a third, poststructuralist self-extending Marxist theory. In PourMarx he
clearly defends the rationalist belief that theory possesses formal
criteria of validity enabling it to distinguish scientific from ideological
claims. Still, in Reading Capital, where he distinguishes between
philosophy and science, he repudiates the "foundational" rationalism
of Pour Marx, vehemently insisting that he does not seek any such
guarantees of a theory's truth) He does not give up the idea that theory
grasps reality, but he denies that theory reduces practice to a slavish
instrument of an autonomous mind. He argues that theory follows its
own practices, and practice presupposes its own theory. Indeed, the
widespread belief that theory and practice form a harmonious unity he
considers a ridiculous myth perpetuated by Hegelian or Sartrian
humanists.
Moreover, in his later works he repudiates the autonomous norms
enabling theory to subvert ideology. He calls the defense of these norms
the error of "theoreticism," and, rejecting the broad distinction
between theory and ideology, he argues that economics, history,
philosophy, mathematics, science, and other disciplines and practices
establish their own "inner" criteria of validity and produce their own
legitimate objects and discourses. These disciplines create what Althusser
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/3
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calls a "knowledge effect," not cognitive truths nor autonomous facts
(60-63). He means that an authoritative exponent of a discipline
considers a particular theory legitimate knowledge because the theory
conforms with the discipline's conventions, languages, procedures, or
protocols, not with an external reality. What Althusser terms a "problematic," which is this ensemble of a discipline's conventions and
discourses, explains why the exponents of a discipline accept certain
theories at one time and other theories at another time. Just as Foucault
assumes that the episteme structuring a discipline explains the cognitive
force of its discourses, so Althusser argues that the problematics of a
discipline explain its "knowledge-effects."
I do not mean to imply that this Foucauldian account of knowledge
resolves the difficulties of Althusser's scientific or rationalist stances.
I mean to say that, even though this stance may not be consistent with
the other stances, this Foucauldian stance gives Althusser the
poststructuralist self that Barrett and others deny him. My reader may
object that these scholars do not simply ignore his Foucauldian theory;
they consider Marxism a closed, outmoded doctrine as viable and
compelling as Ptolomaic astronomy and Greek divination. I grant this
objection. In Foucault, Marxism and History, Mark Poster says that
Marxism describes past eras, when production, factories, machines, and
workers were central, whereas poststructuralists depict the modern era,
in which communication, ideology, and discourse are central. Similarly, in The Politics of Truth Michele Barrett, who defends the
traditional humanist belief that political movements require agency,
intention, and human nature, insists that Karl Marx's unwavering
commitment to scientific truth and class struggle establishes the
essentially anti-feminist, totalitarian nature of any and all Marxisms (34).

Tony Bennett, Literary Theory, Poststructuralism

The work ofTony Bennett, who rejects the theoretical ideals of the
scientists and the rationalists, challenges this belief in an unchanging,
outdated Marxism. In literary terms, Bennett denies the aesthetic
grounds of textual analyses and emphasizes the historical and institutional contexts of literary reception. In Outside Literature, Bennett says
that literary theory cannot tell critics what correct readings must look
like. Like Stanley Fish, who has argued that theory cannot produce valid
interpretations or resolve critical disputes, Bennett insists that theoretical norms cannot regulate interpretive practices (see Fish "Consequences," 36-40). Moreover, he claims that scholars who make theory
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such a criterion of truth accept what he calls bourgeois aesthetics, which
requires a critic to show that his or her judgments of value possess
universal validity. Bennett argues that this aesthetic theory does not
successsfully overcome the opposition between universal values and
the critic's subjective taste. David Hume admits that different persons,
cultures, and eras show a remarkable diversity oftaste, but he still insists
that humankind shows an equally remarkable uniformity of judgment.
He argues that the distinct character of the authoritative critic ensures
that his or her judgements are universally valid, yet he grants that even
these authoritative critics differ. Bennett also says that in Kant's view,
individual judgments of value must employ the universal terms "good"
and "bad," even though these judgments are subjective and hypothetical. Critics talk as though everyone must share their taste, but only the
hypothetical assumption of a common human nature or a common sense
gives these judgments their universality (Outside Literature 150-66).
Bennett also suggests that Marxist humanists imitate these "bourgeois" aestheticians. For example, he says that Hegelian Marxists like
Georg Lukacs and Lucien Goldmann explain canonical works in
profound, socio-historical terms but ignore the canon's origins, reception, and exclusions. Adopting the established canon, these critics
assume that the immanent value of canonical works will become clear
and plain in the communist era, when a rational subject will finally
emerge. Aesthetic judgments can escape the historical relativity of the
established canon because Marxist theory ensures that when history
ends, the universality of the texts' values will be self-evident. (Outside
Literature 31-33; "Marxism" 140-41; "Texts" 13).
Bennett says that scientific Althusserians also seek to overcome the
traditional uneasiness with arbitrary or subjective judgments. However,
the Althusserians argue that a scientific stance exposes the ideological
incoherence, distortion, and gaps hidden by a text and, as a result,
aesthetic judgments acquire the objectivity of socio-historical truths.
Althusserian critics grant literary forms the quasi-scientific ability to
expose ideology's incoherence and gaps, but the Althusserian faith in
scientific theory preserves the rationalist belief that objective truth lies
outside cultural discourse (Outside Literature 126-37).
Bennett denies not only that aesthetic norms justify this ideological
critique but also that totalizing, theoretical self-consciousness undermines institutions or produces historical change. However, while most
postmodern scholars take this repudiation oftheory to destroy ideological criticism, Bennett's Althusserian stance preserves it. For example,
like Bennett, Richard Rorty insists that theory does not ground knowledge, but Rorty critiques traditional epistemology, not aesthetics. In
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/3
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The Consequences of Pragmatism, for example, he complains that
while Platonists, empiricists, and Kantians fiercely oppose each other's
views, they all defend epistemological criteria of truth. The Platonist
argues that the unity and autonomy of Being justifies his belief that the
rational mind can escape its subjective predispositions and grasp the
objective nature of reality. The empiricist argues that sense data, raw
feels, distinct impressions or strong intuitions can expose the metaphysical character of nonsense and ground the positive assertions of
legitimate theory. The Kantian, who seeks a third way between
Platonism and empiricism, argues that the presuppositions of knowledge represent universal rules enabling an individual to escape his or her
subjectivity and to establish the universal framework of knowledge.
Rorty complains that, despite these epistemological differences, the
Platonist, the empiricist, and the Kantian all assume that epistemological criteria enable one to escape one's determinate historical context or
"vocabularies" and to grasp certain, objective truth.
Like Bennett, Rorty forcefully debunks this traditional quest for
epistemological certainty. However, an unredeemed liberal, he considers postmodern theorists like Derrida and Foucault self-conscious
ironists, not public theorists. His argument is that these theorists do not
make propositional kinds of argument; they critique our vocabularies,
denying that any vocabulary and, hence, any rules or conventions are
final. As a consequence, their "ironizing" does not escape their private
subjectivity. In his view, " [i]ronist theorists like Hegel, Nietzsche,
Derrida, and Foucault seem to me invaluable in our attempt to form a
private self-image, but pretty much useless when it comes to politics"
(Contingency 83). Moreover, identifying literary criticism with this
"ironizing," he claims that criticism too is "largely irrelevant to public
life" (Contingency 83). Nancy Fraser rightly objects that Rorty would
"require us to turn our backs on the last hundred years ofsocial history"
(102).
By contrast, Bennett shows that postmodern theory undertakes
valuable ideological criticism. In Bond and Beyond, he and Janet
Woollacott argue that a literary text functions as a passive arena within
which the proponents of different "intertextual" strategies make their
views prevail. As Bennett and Woollacott say, " [t]exts constitute sites
around which the pre-eminently social affair of the struggle for the
production of meaning is conducted" (Bond 59-60). The intentions of
an author or the figures of a text do not reveal the objective truth or
constrain the activity of readers. Rather, what Bennett and Woollacott
call the "production of meaning" is a "pre-eminently social affair"
because readers are situated within and constructed by subjective
Published by New Prairie Press
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institutional structures or, to use his term, "reading formations." To
interpret a text is to contest its terrain, to vindicate one's methods and
ideologies, and, by implication if not by explicit assertion, to debunk
opposed methods and ideologies.
Stanley Fish and Barbara Herrnstein Smith also favor a subjective
account ofliterary criticism. They believe that the beliefs and the values
of the reader explain his or her interpretation of a text. Smith argues that
the traditional "axiology" of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and other
modem aestheticians seeks but fails to impose absolute norms of
universal value. She asserts that these aestheticians do not successfully
overcome the subjectivity of individual taste and the relativity of
individual beliefs. However, Smith emphasizes the individuality of the
reader, whose interpretations express his or her personal "economy"
of values (13). Fish argues that interpretive communities govern the
practices of readers but not of individuals, who circulate among diverse
communities. Bennett also says that the reading formations embedded
in literary institutions govern the interpretations of individual readers,
but, more Foucauldian than either Fish or Smith, Bennett claims that
these reading formations enable schools and universities to discipline
readers, ensuring that they constitute proper political/ethical subjects
(Outside Literature 167).
In other words, Bennett assumes that embedded in distinct institutions literary discourse produces its own social relations and does not
simply mimic or distort them. In the nineteenth century, when the
schools turned literature into what Bennett calls a "moral technology,"
the ideal teacher and, subsequently, the many-layered text, made the
reader's interpretive activity the basis of his or her unending improvement. Bennett says that while traditional "bourgeois" criticism takes
this technology to produce ethical improvement, Marxist criticism
assumes that it provides ideological correction. However, both the
bourgeois and the Marxist critic ignore the technology's power to
constitute the subject (Outside Literature 175-90).
Some opponents of this view might object that in a postmodern
fashion it emphasizes the inescapable present, not theoretical critique,
local academic interests, not the underlying social totality. Certainly
Fredric Jameson, who dismisses the Foucauldian problematic of power
as anti-Marxist, harshly condemns what he calls Bennett's "sinister
variant" of a widespread "anti-intellectualism." As Jameson says,
Bennett "does not seem to realize how obscene American readers are
likely to find his proposals" ("Cultural Studies" 29). In effect,
Jameson reduces Bennett's theory to the "obscene" proposal that
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/3
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civic party. But Bennett's institutional history also bears on pedagogic
issues, including the status of the Anglo-American canon, the place of
cultural studies, the neglect of popular culture, the teacher-centered
character of the classroom, and the gross inadequacies of state and
federal funding. Jameson assumes, as does Theodor Adomo, that the
instrumental rationality dominating modem society makes theoretical
critique the only revolutionary force. But these pressing issues clearly
require not only an engaged, institutional politics, but a historical
analysis as well.
I have argued that Bennett's account of literary studies gives
Althusserian theory the Foucauldian history that its postmodern opponents deny it, and yet, a skeptic could still refuse to believe that
Althusserian theory is Foucauldian or postmodern. After all, without
the social totality, theoretical critique, scientific truth, or class conflict
very little of this Althusser looks or sounds like the Marxism that we
know and love (or hate). Bennett suggests that our trying to answer this
objection may not be worth the effort. Still, the objection is misleading.
It assumes that we have defined once and for all the "true" nature of
Marxism. The many scholars who consign Marxism to the dustbin of
history accept this assumption, but Althusser, who insists that Marxism
is a scientific field and not a set of doctrines, denies it. Bennett may not
definitively establish the postmodern character of Athusserian theory,
but he shows us what a poststructuralist Marxism might look like. This
outline of the poststructuralist Althusser may be less conventional than
the scientific or the rationalist Althusser, but this Althusser is not, on
that account, the less important.

Notes
See Robert Paul Resch's insightful account of this development in
"Modernism, Postmodernism, and Social Theory: A Comparison ofAlthusser
and Foucault," Poetics Today 10.3 (Fall, 1989): 531.
1.
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